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Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) makes the end customer, not your platform, the party who authorizes a sensitive operation. The end customer approves with a WebAuthn passkey. Each approval binds to one operation: this amount, this destination, this account. It works for nothing else. SCA applies to end customers onboarded under Circle’s EEA-regulated entity. Scope follows each end customer, not your platform. See Which end customers require SCA. To implement the flow, see How-to: Implement Strong Customer Authentication.

Which end customers require SCA

Circle determines whether SCA applies to each end customer, and reports it as sca.required on GET /v1/accounts/passkeys:
  • true: protected operations for this end customer return HTTP 428 without SCA headers.
  • false: Circle doesn’t require SCA for this end customer.
When Circle can’t determine the requirement, sca itself is null and the response has no sca.required value. A null sca isn’t the same as false, and it isn’t a lasting answer. Don’t store it, and handle HTTP 428 if the protected endpoint returns it. A true or false answer is safe to store. The protected endpoint returns HTTP 428 whenever SCA is required, so an out-of-date answer can’t let an operation through without SCA. SCA isn’t limited to end customers who require it. A platform can apply one approval flow to every end customer, with the same flow and headers. Circle verifies the headers whenever a request for an end customer carries them, and refuses an invalid, expired, or mismatched approval, or a request with only one of the two headers, with the same error an end customer who requires SCA would get. First-party requests that carry no end customer, such as adding or removing a recipient address your platform owns, or linking your platform’s own wire bank account, never require SCA.

Key terms

What an approval proves

A passkey prompt on its own proves only that someone unlocked a device. SCA proves more than that, because the challenge records the operation before the end customer sees it. Your backend sends the exact operation body to Circle as the challenge intent. Circle stores it and returns a challenge. The ceremony signs that challenge, and Circle accepts the resulting assertion only with the matching request. A valid assertion therefore establishes three things at once:
  • Who approved. The end customer holds the passkey enrolled for their clientEntityId.
  • What they approved. The request body Circle verifies is the same body it recorded in the intent. Changing the amount, the destination, or any other field invalidates the approval and returns error code 420047.
  • That the approval is fresh. A challenge is single-use and expires in minutes, so an intercepted assertion cannot be replayed later or applied to a second operation.
The second point is the property that matters most. Without intent binding, a compromised or buggy frontend could show the end customer one transfer and submit another. Intent binding removes that gap: the operation Circle processes is the operation the end customer saw.

Trust boundary

Circle is the WebAuthn relying party, not your platform. The end customer registers the passkey against Circle, the ceremony runs on a Circle-hosted page, and Circle verifies the assertion. A web application shows the page in an iframe, or in a Circle window in Safari and on iOS. A native application shows it in the system authentication browser. Either way, your application only moves opaque tokens between your frontend and your backend. Two consequences follow from this split:
  • Your application never renders the approval text. The ceremony page fetches the operation description from Circle and displays it. The summary field on the challenge response is a record for your logs, not a source for a confirmation screen you build yourself.
  • Where the ceremony runs must be registered. Circle runs a ceremony only for a web origin or app callback URI that you registered in Circle Hub. Register sandbox and production separately. This stops an unrelated site or application from driving a ceremony against your end customers.

The two ceremonies

Enrollment must complete before an end customer who requires SCA attempts any protected operation. You choose when to prompt for it, for example during onboarding or in account settings. Enrolling before the first protected operation means that operation needs only one ceremony, not two.

Object lifetimes

Every object in the flow is short-lived, which limits the window in which an intercepted token is useful.

Passkeys across devices

A passkey may sync across the end customer’s devices through iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, or a similar service, depending on their platform. A passkey enrolled on a phone may therefore be available on a laptop without re-enrolling. The reverse also holds. An end customer on a device with no synced passkey cannot approve anything until they enroll again. Treat enrollment as a state you check, not a one-time setup step you assume succeeded.

Protected operations

The list covers two categories: operations that move value, and operations that change which destinations are trusted. Circle gates address book and bank account changes too. Otherwise one approval would leave every later transfer to that destination unattended.

What SCA does not cover

SCA answers whether the end customer approved an operation. It does not answer whether Circle should process it.
  • Risk screening and limits still apply. A protected endpoint can accept a valid assertion, return 201, and the operation can still settle as failed after screening. See Limits and risk ratings and Transaction states.
  • SCA is not your application’s login. You remain responsible for authenticating the end customer in your own application and for calling Circle on behalf of the right clientEntityId.
  • SCA is separate from how you authenticate to Circle. SCA verifies the end customer. Your platform authenticates to Circle at the entity level with your API key and, for EU/EEA entities under MiCA, mutual TLS (mTLS). mTLS is enforced against your entity’s API traffic as the distributor, not per end customer or per clientEntityId. See How mTLS authentication works.
  • SCA does not cover read operations. Only the operations listed in Protected operations require an assertion.